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Introduction  
On 20 March 2003, defying the United Nations and several of its allies1, the Bush 
administration launched Operation Iraqi Freedom. The invasion of Iraq and the subsequent 
overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime were not only met with international criticism but also 
with many unforeseen challenges. While the Bush administration claimed the war was pre-emptive 
and aimed at eliminating Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, it soon became evident that Saddam 
Hussein’s regime had not been in the possession of such weapons. Today, the widely accepted 
explanation is that the decision to overthrow the Ba’athist regime in Iraq was “a product of the 
political biases, misguided priorities, intentional deceptions and grand strategies of President 
George W. Bush and prominent ‘neoconservatives’, ‘unilateralists’, and ‘Vulcans’ on his national 
security team.”2 By April 2003, U.S. forces moved into Baghdad, successfully putting an end to 
the twenty-four year rule of Saddam Hussein. Immediately afterwards, the Coalition Provisional 
Authority (CPA), a U.S.-led transitional government, was granted executive, legislative and 
judicial authority over Iraq. On April 21st, the CPA came under the authority of Jay Garner, a 
military officer who took part in the 1991 Gulf War.3 Because Garner failed to deal with the post-
war chaos4, he was replaced a few weeks later by Paul Bremer, an antiterrorism expert who had 
neither military experience nor any experience with Middle Eastern affairs.5 The decision to 
																																																													
1 For example: Opposition to the Iraq War was expressed by France, Germany, Russia, and China (all United 
Nations Security Council members); Turkey, the European Parliament, and the Arab League (with the exception of 
Kuwait). See: Micah L. Sifry and Christopher Cerf, The Iraq War Reader: History, Documents and Opinions (New 
York: Touchstone, 2003), 502.  
2 Frank P. Harvey, Explaining the Iraq War: Counterfactual Theory, Logic and Evidence (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), 1.  
3 Pfiffner, James P, “US Blunders in Iraq: De-Ba’athification and Disbanding the Army” Intelligence and National 
Security 25, no. 1 (2010), 76. 
4 Immediately after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, there was widespread looting and violence in Iraq. This will 
be elaborated on later in this thesis. 
5 Rick Fawn and Raymond Hinnebusch, The Iraq War: Causes and Consequences (London: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2006), 9. 
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appoint Bremer is characteristic for the overall handling of the immediate aftermath of Saddam 
Hussein’s overthrow by the U.S. government: decision-making was often conducted by people 
with little to no experience with Iraq or Middle Eastern affairs.  
Bremer soon made two decisions that would have far-reaching consequences.6 On the 16th 
of May, Bremer ordered CPA Order 1: the banning of all senior members of Iraq’s ruling party, 
the Ba’ath party, from serving in the government, as well as the removal of the top three layers of 
officials of all government ministries, even if they were not members of the Ba’ath party.7 Several 
days later, going against the advice of the army and the professional planners, Bremer issued CPA 
Order 2, which entailed the disbanding of the Iraqi army.8 The Ministries of Defense, Information, 
and State for Military Affairs, the Iraqi Intelligence Service, the National Security Bureau, the 
Directorate of National Security, the Special Security Organization, the Army, the Air Force, the 
Navy, the Air Defense Force, the Republican Guard, the Special Republican Guard, the Directorate 
of Military Intelligence, the Al Quds Force and the Emergency Forces, along with thirteen other 
paramilitaries and other military organizations, ceased to exist.9 This rapid and sudden destruction 
of a large part of Iraqi society and civilian infrastructure left the country in a state of chaos that 
would continue for a long time to come. 
Eleven years later, in early 2014, the sudden and rapid emergence of Daesh10 took many 
by surprise. This Iraqi Sunni terrorist group was successfully fighting the Iraqi army and 
																																																													
6 Pfiffner, “US Blunders in Iraq”, 78. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid., 80. 
9 Coalition Provisional Authority. “CPA Order 2: Dissolution of Entities”. 23 August 2003.  
10 The self-proclaimed Islamic State is known by several names in English, including ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and 
Syria), ISIL (Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant), and IS (Islamic State). In Arabic, the group wants to be referred 
to by its full name:  مﺎﺸﻟاو قاﺮﻌﻟا ﻲﻓ ﺔﯿﻣﻼﺳﻹا ﺔﻟوﺪﻟا, ‘al-dowla al-islaamiyya fii-il-i’raaq wa-ash-shaam’, which translates 
to Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (Guthrie). However, a widely used acronym in Arabic is Daesh (ﺶﻋاد). In order to 
understand why this thesis refers to the group as Daesh, a brief linguistic analysis is appropriate. Daesh themselves 
find the use of this name problematic: the abbreviation, as a result of how it sounds, now means “tyrannical, 
despotic fundamentalists who claim to be Islamic and claim to be a state” (Guthrie). Moreover, Daesh do not 
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conquering large amounts of Iraqi territory in the process. However, Daesh had been active in Iraq 
since 2004 under the name “Al Qaeda in Iraq” and later “Islamic State in Iraq”, and was well able 
to benefit from the instability that arose after the U.S. invasion and occupation. Concern arose 
especially when Daesh seized control over Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city, in June 2014, and 
declared the establishment of a caliphate in Iraq and Syria. While many analysts agreed that the 
emergence of Daesh could be attributed to the instability that arose in Iraq as a result of the 2003 
U.S. invasion, analyses of Daesh’s emergence rarely go into specifics. This thesis will seek to 
make a contribution to the existing literature by exploring whether or not the de-Ba’athification 
policy implemented in Iraq in 2003 led to the emergence of Daesh in early 2014, by answering the 
following research question: How did the de-Ba’athification policy as implemented by the United 
States after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein lead to the emergence of Daesh in early 2014? 
 
State of the field 
Considering that the subject matter is relatively new, it is not surprising that there is little 
academic literature on the nature of the emergence of Daesh. Most literature seems to bypass the 
origins of Daesh and focus instead on policy proposals, discourse analyses, or military analyses.11 
Nevertheless, there are several broad lines of reasoning to be identified in current academic 
discourse. In some cases, the emergence of Daesh is attributed to a more general feeling of 
																																																													
appreciate the name because acronyms are unusual in Arabic: “They want to be addressed as exactly what they 
claim to be, by people so in awe of them that they use the pompous, long and delusional name created by the group, 
not some funny-sounding made-up word” (Guthrie). According to Guthrie, the name Daesh is rightly understood as 
being a challenge to the legitimacy of Daesh; “a dismissal of their aspirations to define Islamic practice, to be ‘a 
state for all Muslims’ and – crucially – as a refusal to acknowledge and address them as such” (Guthrie). For this 
reason, this thesis will refer to the group as Daesh. 
11 See e.g. Ingram, “An Analysis of Islamic State’s Dabiq Magazine” Australian Journal of Political Science 51, no. 
3 (2016), 458-477; Richard A. Clarke and Emilian Papadopoulos, “Terrorism in Perspective”: A Review for the 
Next American President”, ANNALS 668, no. 1 (2016), 8-18 
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discontent among Muslims: unhappy with some of the Western-imposed regimes in the Middle 
East, groups such as Daesh now seek to overthrow existing regimes and establish new states.12 
Another prevalent explanation, particularly popular among right-wing media and politicians and 
stemming from Daesh’s strong propagation of Islamic ideals, attributes the emergence of Daesh 
to religious rather than political reasons.13 Other subjects regarding academic literature on Daesh 
deal with its use of social media in order to recruit people.14 It is also interesting to look at how 
members of Daesh themselves explain their emergence, by looking at their propaganda magazine 
Dabiq. They primarily stress religious reasons, mainly that the establishment of a caliphate has 
been something that has “occupied the hearts of the mujahidin since the revival of jihad this 
century.”15 Perhaps the most significant explanation is their statement that the war waged against 
Islamic terrorism over the past decades has left almost no safe haven for the mujahidin, and as 
such, “the ideal land for hijrah was a place where they could operate without the threat of a 
powerful police state.”16 In other words, political circumstances in Iraq and Syria are considered 
by Daesh to have allowed them to establish their “Islamic State,” by using states with weak central 
authority as a base for jihad.17  
As this literary analysis demonstrates, there is a gap in the academic literature where it 
concerns the connection between U.S.-implemented policies after the overthrow of Saddam 
Hussein and the emergence of Daesh in early 2014. In fact, little attention is being paid to historical 
analyses in general – while Sykes-Picot is sometimes referred to as a cause for Iraq’s domestic 
instability, in particular because Daesh regularly refers to it, such explanations rarely go into 
																																																													
12 Clarke and Papadopoulos, “Terrorism in Perspective”, 10.  
13 See e.g. David Paul, “Is ISIS A Religious Group? Of Course It Is”, The Huffington Post, 22 February 2015. 
14 See e.g. Ingram, “An Analysis of Islamic State’s Dabiq Magazine”, 458-477. 
15 “The Return of Khilafah”, Dabiq 1, Al Hayat Media Center, 28 June 2014, 35. 
16 Ibid., 36. N.b.: Hijrah translates to “migration”, and usually implies migrating for religious reasons. 
17 Ibid., 38. 
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specifics. Moreover, despite several mentions of it18, there is a lack of any well-grounded, in-depth 
historical analysis of the relation between de-Ba’athification and the rise of Daesh. This is what 
makes this thesis particularly relevant: a better understanding of the result of the de-Ba’athification 
policy is crucial in order to understand the current state of affairs in Iraq.  
 
Pattern of organization 
The first chapter of this thesis will consist largely of background information necessary in 
order to understand the de-Ba’athification policy. First, it will provide a very brief history of Iraq, 
from its time as part of the Ottoman Empire to the Ba'athist coups that eventually led to the 
establishment of Saddam Hussein's regime. Then, it will discuss the Ba’ath party’s rule of Iraq and 
how government worked under the Ba’ath party, in order to better understand the effect of the de-
Ba’athification policy. Over the years, Saddam Hussein had established a minority regime where 
every government official was a member of the same Ba’ath party. In a state where enemies had 
been largely eliminated, where control had been consolidated on every level by one figure and one 
party, what happens when the entire state structure which was built around the Ba’ath party is 
suddenly taken away? Answering such questions allows for a better understanding of the disastrous 
consequences of the de-Ba’athification policy. Finally, this chapter will discuss the 2003 invasion 
of Iraq, the decision-making process that led to the war, and how it was conducted. As such, the 
main purpose of this chapter is to provide the reader with historical context in order to develop a 
better understanding of the events that this thesis focuses on. 
																																																													
18 See e.g. John Bew and Shiraz Maher, “Blowback”, New Statesman (June 2014), 20-26; Zachary Laub, “Islamic 
State in Iraq and Greater Syria”, Council on Foreign Relations, June 2014.  
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 The second chapter will focus entirely on explaining the de-Ba’athification policy, by 
providing a detailed overview of both CPA orders that are referred to as de-Ba’athification: the 
disbanding of the Iraqi army and the removal of Ba’ath officials from government. In order to 
address how and why this policy was implemented, it will provide analyses of the decision-making 
process. Then, it will focus on the CPA orders that led to the process of de-Ba’athification, and 
demonstrate how this policy was executed. This chapter will therefore serve a more explanatory 
rather than analytical function.  
 
 After providing the context necessary to frame and explore the main argument of this thesis, 
the third and fourth chapters will both be dedicated to exploring different aspects to de-
Ba'athification in order to demonstrate how de-Ba'athification has facilitated, indirectly or directly, 
the emergence of Daesh.  
 
 The third chapter will demonstrate how de-Ba'athification has allowed for the creation of 
an environment that made it possible for Daesh to emerge from and to develop into a successful 
and powerful non-state actor. This chapter will focus primarily on assessing the effects of CPA 
Order 1, the de-Ba'athification of the Iraqi state and the removal of all Ba'ath officials from power. 
It will provide a brief overview of the history of Daesh in order to demonstrate how Daesh filled 
the vacuum left by the de-Ba'athification of Iraq. This chapter will highlight how the consequences 
of de-Ba’athification played out on different levels, primarily by analyzing its direct and indirect 
effects on the Iraqi state structure and political system, and subsequently assess how these 
consequences contributed to the emergence of Daesh. Through discussing Iraqi state collapse and 
providing a theoretical framework for state survival, this chapter will demonstrate how de-
Ba'athification essentially facilitated Iraqi state collapse, contributing to the emergence of violent 
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extremist groups such as Daesh. In order to further reinforce this chapter's argument, this chapter 
will then provide a case study focusing on Iraq's political system post-2003 and assess how this 
system has contributed to creating an environment from which Daesh could emerge. 
 
 The fourth chapter will focus on the direct and indirect effects of CPA Order 2, the 
disbanding of the Iraqi military. The approach of this chapter is two-fold: first, it will assess how 
de-Ba’athification has contributed to creating the insurgents of Daesh, by looking at the 
involvement of former Ba’ath members in Daesh leadership. Second, it will analyze the indirect 
effects of CPA Order 2 by looking at how the disbanding of the Iraqi army has facilitated the 
emergence of Daesh. Finally, by using the fall of Mosul as a case study, this chapter will emphasize 
how de-Ba’athification on the military level contributed to the emergence of Daesh.  
 
Theoretical framework 
To a large extent, this thesis deals with the question of state survival and state collapse. 
Explaining the emergence of Daesh through de-Ba’athification requires an accurate assessment of 
the effects of de-Ba’athification on the Iraqi state and political system. In order to adequately 
analyze the effects of de-Ba’athification on the Iraqi state, certain sections of this thesis will make 
use of a theory developed by Professor William Zartman on state survival and state collapse. While 
it is not explicitly mentioned in every section, this framework for state survival still connects to 
nearly every aspect of the main argument of this thesis.  
Assessing the pillars of state survival is necessary in order to demonstrate how de-
Ba’athification facilitated the collapse of the Iraqi state, which in turn made possible the emergence 
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of Daesh. Viewing the research question of this thesis through the lens of this framework not only 
allows it to measure the effects of de-Ba’athification on the Iraqi state, but also contributes to a 
well-grounded analysis of the consequences of de-Ba’athification and their relation to Daesh. In 
order to create a clear and consistent connection between this theoretical framework and the subject 
matter and case studies, this theory will be explained in the relevant chapters themselves rather 
than in the introduction of this thesis.19 
 
Methodology 
In order to provide a coherent and well-structured answer to the research question, this 
thesis will employ a qualitative approach, consisting of the collecting and interpreting of secondary 
data and academic literature. It will include analyses of government documents, such as the CPA 
orders discussed earlier, in order to provide an accurate representation of historical events. 
Moreover, in order to analyze decision-making processes, this thesis will refer to interviews and 
statements provided by government officials who were involved in these processes. It will engage 
both in theoretical framing of the argument, as well as the use of case studies and discourse 
analyses. 
 
 
 
	
																																																													
19 For a detailed discussion of this theory, see: Chapter 3.1.  
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Chapter 1 – Ottomans and Ba’athists: Historical context of Iraq 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the reader with a brief historical overview of Iraq 
and an assessment of the Ba’ath party’s rule over Iraq, in order to provide a solid basis from which 
to analyze the effects of de-Ba’athification on Iraq.  
 
1.1 A brief history of Iraq 
 The Ottoman Empire 
During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the territory of the Iraqi state as we know 
it today was slowly and sporadically incorporated into the Ottoman Empire as the three Ottoman 
provinces of Baghdad, Basra and Mosul, modern Iraq’s largest cities.20 Under Ottoman rule for 
nearly four centuries, the Iraqi vilayets, like many others in the Empire, enjoyed “relative 
administrative, economic and fiscal autonomy.”21 Due to inadequate communication methods and 
the geographic inaccessibility of much of the land, the central government’s authority did not reach 
far outside its capital and administrative control was largely exercised by locals until at least the 
mid-19th century.22 Therefore, until the British mandate was established in 1920, Iraqi and Kurdish 
tribes managed to successfully resist penetration of the central Ottoman government.23 The three 
vilayets had little to do with each other: “At least until the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, 
Basra looked towards the Gulf and India, Baghdad was an important staging point on the land 
																																																													
20 Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 8. 
21 Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship (London: I. B. 
Tauris Publishers, 1987), 2.  
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
13 
	
route between Syria and Iran, and Mosul tended to have closer ties with Anatolia and Aleppo than 
with Baghdad.”24 In other words, although the three vilayets were formally part of the Ottoman 
Empire, the state system had not penetrated the region equally, government authority was not 
present everywhere, and the vilayets that would later be united under the banner of a single state 
now barely formed a coherent economic or geopolitical unit among themselves. 
In the mid-19th century, the Ottoman Empire underwent a period of reform known as the 
Tanzimat, which greatly transformed its administrative structure.25 In an attempt to counter 
separatist sentiments and increasing European penetration, these reforms sought to establish a 
greater sense of Ottoman citizenship and increase the central governments’ authority over its 
empire.26 The three Iraqi vilayets were gradually “drawn into what was becoming an increasingly 
homogenous imperial system.”27 These attempts coincided with increased European commercial 
interest in the region: the British were especially interested in Iraq, where oil was discovered 
around the 1870’s.28 Simultaneously, in the late 19th century Arab intellectuals increasingly felt 
that the Arabs’ political and cultural aspirations would be better off if the Arabs were separated 
from the Ottoman Empire and established their own autonomous states.29  
 
																																																													
24 Ibid. 
25 William L. Cleveland and Martin Bunton, A History of the Modern Middle East (New York: The Perseus Book 
Group, 2012), 76. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958, 9. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid.; Courtney Hunt, The History of Iraq (Santa Barbara: Greenwood Press, 2005), 58. 
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The British Mandate era 
In 1914, as part of the Mesopotamian Campaign, the British consolidated control over the 
area that would later become the Iraqi nation-state. The discovery of oil in Iraq in the 1870s was 
an important reason for British interest in Iraq, but not the only one: its strategic location as a 
shorter trade route to its most important colony, India, played a large role too.30 During the First 
World War, as the Ottoman Empire weakened, the French and British both sought to secure their 
interests in the region. France became alarmed by Britain’s increasing military influence in the 
region, and negotiators from both states drew up a secret agreement in May 1916, in which they 
divided up the Arab Middle East.31 This Sykes-Picot Agreement granted France a large zone of 
direct control, ranging from the Syrian coast to southern Lebanon into Anatolia.32 Britain’s 
interests were also secured: it was allowed to exercise direct control over the southern part of 
Mesopotamia, and was granted exclusive indirect control over an area ranging from Gaza to 
Kirkuk.33 Rather than taking into account the needs of the region’s inhabitants, this agreement 
focused solely on serving the interests of the European expansionist powers.34  
For Iraq, this had several implications. First, it now had a population that was vastly diverse 
in terms of religion – the majority of Iraqis are Shia Muslims, Sunni Muslims account for 
approximately 30% of the population – as well as ethnic and tribal lines: in particular Iraq’s Kurds, 
who account for 10-15% of the population, have been struggling for autonomy from the start. 35 
There is nothing inherently problematic about different religious and ethnic backgrounds living 
																																																													
30 Ibid. 
31 Cleveland and Bunton, A History of the Modern Middle East, 149. 
32 Ibid., 150.  
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., 149. 
35 “The World Factbook”, Central Intelligence Agency, accessed 6 March, 2017. 
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together in one nation, but the problematic aspect of Sykes-Picot is that it failed to take into account 
the needs and wishes of the region’s inhabitants and disturbed family and economic networks. 
Moreover, understanding how Iraq was created is important to know in order to understand the 
ethnic and sectarian tensions that arose after 2003. Furthermore, because these states were 
artificially created, identity is often incongruent with with state boundaries.36 “Constructed in 1920 
out of three provinces of the Ottoman Empire that had never shared a common history as a political 
community, the Iraqi state encompassed a large number of communities that looked with suspicion 
upon the others and often had greater affinities with peoples beyond the newly drawn borders of 
Iraq itself.”37 As a result of this artificiality, Arab regimes often suffer legitimacy deficits and Arab 
states tend to lack secure national identities.38 Understanding how Iraq and other Middle-Eastern 
states were formed is crucial to understanding some of the long-lasting problems that the region 
faces. The dividing up of a region according to the interests of Western powers who paid no 
attention to the interests of the indigenous people is a decision that still sparks resentment today. 
Moreover, the fact that the region was vastly diverse in terms of religious, tribal, and ethnic 
identities made it prone to divide-and-rule tactics of both foreign and domestic powers. For Daesh, 
the Sykes-Picot agreement is a popular topic: for example, they see it as one of their goals to “drive 
the last nail in the coffin of the Sykes-Picot conspiracy.”39 Furthermore, they see the agreement as 
symbolic for the “fragmentation imposed upon Muslims” and rather, seek to “bring Muslims 
together under one banner” in order to re-divide the world based on creed rather than race, nation 
																																																													
36 Raymond Hinnebusch, “The Politics of Identity in Middle East International Relations”, in International 
Relations of the Middle East, ed. Louise Fawcett, 148. 
37 Charles Tripp, “The Foreign Policy of Iraq”, in The Foreign Policy of Middle East States, ed. Raymond 
Hinnebusch and Anoushiravan Ehteshami, 174.  
38 Raymond Hinnebusch, “Introduction: An Analytical Framework”, in The Foreign Policy of Middle East States, 
ed. Raymond Hinnebusch and Anoushiravan Ehteshami, 7.  
39 “Remaining and Expanding”, Dabiq 5, Al Hayat Media Center, October 2014, 33. 
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or tribe.40 In other words, even though Sykes-Picot celebrated its 100th anniversary last year, its 
legacy remains subject to controversy and discussion. 
At the Conference of San Remo in April 1920, a year after World War I officially came to 
an end, the League of Nations decided on the fate of the region formerly part of the Ottoman 
Empire – whose dissolution had been inaugurated by the signing of the Treaty of Sèvres in 1920.41 
Until the newly found mandates were able to govern themselves, they would be under control of 
European states.42 The British were granted full control over the area that would become Iraq. In 
1921, at the Conference of Cairo, the Kingdom of Iraq was created. The three vilayets that had 
never formed a coherent whole, suddenly formed a nation-state. The Iraqi monarchy would 
maintain a firm grip on Iraq until the coup d’état of 1958.43 After almost a decade of turmoil, in 
1968 the Ba’ath party’s coup was the start to its thirty-five year domination over Iraq.44 Saddam 
Hussein played a crucial role in this coup and in the formation of the newly established regime. 
As vice-chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council, Saddam Hussein was a key figure in 
shaping the regime’s policies and by the early 1970’s had emerged as the real force behind the 
regime.45  
 
 
 
																																																													
40 S. J. Prince, “ISIS Releases Statement on 100th Anniversary of Sykes-Picot”, Heavy.com.  
41 Hunt, The History of Iraq, 61. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Cleveland and Bunton, A History of the Modern Middle East, 304.  
44 Joseph Sassoon, Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath Party: Inside an Authoritarian Regime (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), 16. 
45 Cleveland and Bunton, A History of the Modern Middle East, 425-426.  
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Iraq from 1979-2003 
In 1979, Saddam Hussein officially became the president of Iraq. Despite the many 
upheavals Iraq experienced during the Ba’ath party’s thirty-five-year rule, Saddam Hussein 
managed to maintain a stable regime with a firm grip on Iraq. In 1980, Iraq invaded Iran, the start 
to a gruesome war which would last eight years and eventually ended in stalemate. A mere two 
years later, in 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. The U.S. was quick to counter this threat to its strategic 
interests in the region by launching a military operation, successfully forcing Iraqi troops out of 
Kuwait by 1991. Afterwards, the United Nations imposed sanctions on Iraq, intended both as a 
punishment for its behavior towards Kuwait and as a means to enforce Iraqi compliance with UN 
demands.46 As a result, Iraq experienced a near-total exclusion from the world economy between 
1990 and 2003: the sanctions had a crippling effect on both the Iraqi people and the economy, to 
such an extent that even a United Nations investigation team labeled them as “near-apocalyptic”, 
and proclaimed that life in Iraq had been reduced to a “pre-industrial stage”.47 The sanctions would 
not be lifted until the overthrow of the Ba’ath regime in 2003. However, the sanctions did not 
affect the Ba’ath party leadership – in fact, there were widespread allegations of corruption and 
fraud with the UN’s Oil-for-Food Program, which from 1995 onwards allowed Iraq to sell its oil 
in exchange for humanitarian goods. The program allowed the Ba’ath regime to profit at the 
expense of the Iraqi people, and investigators claimed that Shia and Kurdish Iraqis received hardly 
any aid at all.48 Despite all of these challenges, Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath party held a firm 
																																																													
46 Mustafa Koc, Carey Jernigan and Rupen Das, “Food Security and Food Sovereignty in Iraq”, Food, Culture & 
Society: An International Journal of Multidisciplinary Research 10.2 (2007), 317. 
47 Reem Bahdi, “Iraq, Sanctions and Security: A Critique”, Duke Journal of Gender Law and Policy 9, no. 237 
(2002), 238; Koc, Jernigan and Das, “Food Security”, 317 
48 Hunt, The History of Iraq, 104. 
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grip on Iraq, and managed to exercise exclusive control over public life in the economic, social 
and political domains.49 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																																													
49 Laith Kubba, “The Awakening of Civil Society”, Journal of Democracy 11, no. 3 (2000), 86. 
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1.2 The Ba’ath party’s influence on Iraq 
The second part of this chapter will seek to demonstrate and analyze how the Ba’ath party 
governed Iraq. This is crucial in order to understand the effects of the de-Ba’athification policy. 
The following pages will thus be dedicated to explaining the nature and durability of the regime, 
assessing how the Ba’ath party ruled Iraq, and demonstrating its effect and influence on society. 
The Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party has socialist roots but focused heavily on promoting Arab 
nationalist ideology.50 Its motto is “Unity, Liberty, Socialism”: three concepts which the regime 
propagated more than it actually implemented them. Unity refers to the concept of Arab unity, an 
ideology that focused not on the nation-state but rather on Arab identity and the unity of all Arab 
states – something that stems from the aforementioned lack of national identity.51 Similarly, liberty 
referred to liberation from Western imperial powers – both concepts were heavily propagated by 
Saddam Hussein.52 Socialism was more an idea than a policy for the Ba’ath party: although it 
believed in socialism “as a means for the total and radical liberation of the Arab individual”, the 
party implemented hardly any socialist policies, particularly not in the economic realm.53 For 
example, the Ba’ath party ensured that all economic decrees were geared primarily to strengthen 
the control of the regime.54 Aside from its self-proclaimed ideological interests, the Ba’ath party 
was heavily entrenched in every aspect of daily life in Iraq.  
Despite the turbulent path the Iraqi Ba’ath regime followed – from its eight-year war with 
Iran, its invasion of Kuwait, its recurrent conflicts with the Iraqi Kurds, a major uprising in 1991, 
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to thirteen years of UN-imposed sanctions, the regime’s grip on society was strong enough for it 
to survive.55 Sassoon attributes the regime survival mostly to how the Ba’ath party “systematically 
penetrated every stratum of society and built an impressive political machine more powerful than 
any other group in Iraq, which drew large numbers of people into its sphere of influence.”56 
Through the use of extreme violence and terror against its citizens, the Ba’ath regime created a 
parallel system of rewards for its supporters and continuously stressed the importance and 
necessity of universal support and loyalty.57 Moreover, what explains the regime’s durability, 
Sassoon argues, was the centralization of power, Saddam Hussein’s dominating personality, and 
the apparatus of repression that the party developed in Iraq.58 The regime was ruthless and 
unrelenting towards those whose loyalties were suspect: countless people were sentenced to prison 
or hanged in public executions, seeking to remind Iraqis who dared oppose the regime of the fate 
that awaited them.59 For example, several weeks after taking office as president, Saddam Hussein 
gathered fellow Ba’ath party members and accused them of collaborating with the Syrian regime 
against Iraq’s regime. His unfounded accusations were an important step in consolidating control 
over the party by instilling fear among its members. One by one, he called out the names of several 
dozens of party members, all of whom he accused of disloyalty, before they were taken away and 
imprisoned or executed. Afterwards, behind closed doors, he ordered the execution of another 
several hundred party members and military officials.60 This infamous incident demonstrates not 
only how ruthless and intimidating the regime’s tactics were in order to consolidate power, but 
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also how crucial loyalty to Saddam Hussein was. “His modes of control were more intrusive, 
sophisticated, and extensive than the resistance (…) could overcome.”61  
Nevertheless, fear and the threat of violence were not the only factors facilitating 
compliance: The Ba’ath party’s ideology appealed to many people, and the power and benefits 
that working for the Ba’ath party entailed convinced many people from varying socioeconomic 
backgrounds to become part of the Ba’athist system.62 While the Ba’ath party applied a great deal 
of pressure upon its citizens to join the party, many joined voluntarily, either for ideological 
reasons or because they wanted to reap the benefits of being a Ba’athist.63 As such, another key 
factor in explaining the regime’s success lie in its “ability to attract large numbers of supporters 
and make them feel vested in the system.”64 As mentioned previously, loyalty to Saddam Hussein 
was of the utmost importance. The Ba’ath party regime thus relied heavily upon tribal, family, and 
kin associations.65 Some sources66 even suggest that Saddam Hussein abolished the use of last 
names in order to conceal how many of the regime’s key figures had the same surname – al-Majid 
al-Tikriti – as Saddam Hussein himself. Because of this heavy reliance on family and tribal 
associations, Sassoon argues that the Ba’ath regime was both a single-party and a personalist 
regime: “Benefits were distributed to a larger proportion of citizens than is usual in personalist 
regimes, but, unlike a one-party system, the regime was dominated largely by a single familial, 
clan, ethnic, or regional group.”67 Similarly, Tripp ascribes great importance to the social networks 
of kinship that Saddam Hussein reinforced during his rule. Using these social networks as channels 
																																																													
61 Sassoon, Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath Party, 226. 
62 Ibid., 8. 
63 Ibid., 8. 
64 Ibid., 8. 
65 Ibid., 11.  
66 See e.g.: Dilip Hiro, Neighors, Not Friends: Iraq and Iran After the Gulf Wars (New York: Routledge, 2001); Jon 
E. Lewis, The Mammoth Book of Covert Ops (Philadelphia: Running Press, 2004). 
67 Sassoon, Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath Party, 276. 
22 
	
of reward and punishment has been so effective that many individuals, far removed from any 
obvious tribal identity, sought to affiliate themselves with certain tribal groups in order to benefit 
from the protection and security it entailed.68 Moreover, the Ba’ath regime used the accumulated 
oil wealth to sustain a relatively generous distributive state welfare system, stimulating social and 
economic advancement for Iraq’s middle class, including groups that had thus far only existed on 
the margins of society, such as the urban poor and the rural migrants.69  
 The Ba’ath party’s recruitment of new members, its creation and fusion of new branches 
of government in order to enhance efficiency, and its encouragement of competition among 
branches and members made its structure resemble that of a large cooperation.70 Everyone in the 
party hierarchy was under constant pressure to perform, and the party made sure to know all there 
was to know about each of its affiliates.71 The regime was constantly weary of subversion, resulting 
in an obsession with the centralization of power.72 Moreover, because officials were mistrusting 
of even their own employees, the bureaucracy was entrenched with layers of supervision, ensuring 
that the Ba’ath party was involved in everything and that nothing could escape its control.73  
 Sassoon provides several examples74 that demonstrate the Ba’ath party’s influence on 
every day life: from its monitoring of all mosques and all individuals affiliated with religious 
institutions; the controlling of students’ activities both in Iraq and abroad in order to increase 
Ba’ath influence on education and academics, to the Ba’ath party’s domination over labor unions 
and professional organizations – the Ba’ath party was overwhelmingly present and dominant in all 
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civil activities.75 A report by the  NGO Coordination Committee for Iraq identifies three ways in 
which the Ba’ath regime successfully incorporated and controlled civil society.76 First, preexisting 
organizations were contained and controlled through policies of invitation and intimidation; 
loyalty and submission were rewarded, and punishment awaited those who hesitated or refused to 
comply.77 For example, the Ba’ath party’s main competitor, the Iraqi Communist Party, was 
gradually co-opted in the early 1970’s: what started off with the monitoring of meetings and 
pressuring and threatening of members, eventually led to widespread imprisonment and execution 
of its members, until the Ba’ath party no longer felt threatened by the ICP.78 Second, the Ba’ath 
party created many new organizations and assigned a high ranking office, the Office of Popular 
Organizations, to supervise these organizations.79 Finally, all groups and parties who failed to 
abide by the aforementioned criteria were banned.80 “The development of an independent civil 
society was thwarted in favor of supporting organizations closely linked to and monitored by the 
government.”81 Any organization threatening the status quo was forced out under the pretext of 
threatening national security or violating the law.82 Through these policies, the Ba’ath party 
managed to entrench itself in every sector of civil society and gained exclusive control over all 
activities in this domain. 
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Conclusion 
 Despite – or perhaps because of – its extensive bureaucracy and many layers of supervision, 
the Ba’ath party maintained a well-functioning state system that managed to survive many crises. 
The regime’s willingness to use tactics of fear and violence in order to keep the population under 
control; its commitment to eliminating opposition; its successful recruitment of party members 
from diverse socioeconomic backgrounds; its ability to exploit the resourcefulness and talent of 
educated Iraqis in maintaining Iraq’s structures all contributed to keeping the regime stable through 
many years of turmoil.83 Naturally, the sanctions did have severe effects on Iraq: although by late 
2000 the UN eased sanctions and the Iraqi economy had begun to recover and the infrastructure 
was improving, by the time Saddam Hussein was overthrown in 2003, Iraq’s industry was 
damaged and its army less strong than it had claimed to be.84 However, this does not mean that the 
Ba’ath party’s hold over Iraq had weakened: after all, it needed a military invasion and a legal and 
formal banning of the party to be broken down. It is  therefore doubtful that the regime would have 
disintegrated were it not for the 2003 invasion: Saddam Hussein held firm control over all enclaves 
of power, and all opposition groups had either been weakened, infiltrated or eliminated.85  
Through its bureaucracy and ideology, the Ba’ath party had entrenched itself so deeply into 
society that it had become crucial for stability and impossible to avoid or ignore. Iraqi citizens, 
regardless of age or socioeconomic status, had no other choice but to adapt to the regime’s imposed 
structures of reward and punishment.86 Because the Ba’ath party’s state institutions managed to 
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reshape society and break organized resistance, there was no functioning civil society.87 Any 
institution capable of shielding society from the power of the sate had been broken, co-opted or 
reconstructed.88 “In its consolidation of power, the party managed to weave a network of control 
across the whole spectrum of Iraqi life. (…) From cradle to grave, it is hard to find any aspect of 
state or society in which the party did not wield some influence.”89  
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Chapter 2 – The CPA and the de-Ba’athification Orders 
“If this place succeeds, it will be in spite of what we did, not because of it.” 
– Anonymous CPA official stationed in Baghdad 90  
  
Following up on the previous chapter highlighting the Ba’ath party’s influence on Iraq, this 
chapter will demonstrate how the U.S. sought to erase this influence, and will briefly discuss some 
of the major consequences of this decision. It will discuss the role of the CPA, explain in detail the 
two orders that together are known as de-Ba’athification, and demonstrate the decision-making 
process surrounding these orders and how they were executed.  
As discussed in the introduction of this thesis, the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq and its 
aftermath were met with many unforeseen challenges. During its fourteen-month occupation of 
Iraq, the U.S. made many mistakes in managing the chaotic post-war situation that had erupted. 
Many of these issues stemmed from a lack of planning – as a State Department official stated: “We 
went in not with a plan but with a theory.”91 From many analyses of the decision-making process 
appears that there simply was no plan to manage Iraq after Saddam Hussein was removed from 
power, which in turns explains the problems the U.S. faced after the invasion.92 In an article 
focused on explaining why the stabilization of Iraq after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein was so 
poorly executed, David highlights some of the most grievous mistakes made: 
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The failure to restore order immediately after the fall of the regime and to control 
widespread, often spectacular, acts of pillaging; the lack of interpreters and troops 
on the ground; the decision to dismantle the Iraqi army, the Ba’ath party and the 
Iraqi government; the inexperienced personnel on the ground; the Administration’s 
corruption and inefficiency; the abuses; the torture; the failure to maintain public 
services; and the lack of a credible political alternative to replace Saddam Hussein. 
All illustrate the extent of mismanagement in the post-Hussein period.93 
 
The Coalition Provisional Authority 
The Coalition Provisional Authority, or CPA, was established two months before the 
invasion in January 2003, and was tasked with governing Iraq after the overthrow of Saddam 
Hussein until a new, democratically elected government would take place. The CPA was headed 
by Lieutenant Paul Bremer, who arrived in Iraq two months after the invasion, tasked to rebuild 
Iraq and manage the post-war chaos. As the Ba’ath regime collapsed, widespread looting and 
violence occurred across Iraq. Like most U.S. officials sent to Iraq, Bremer did not speak Arabic 
nor had any experience with Middle-Eastern affairs or post-war reconstruction.94 Many mistakes 
were made under Bremer’s leadership – Washington’s refusal to read reports written by officials 
on the ground in Baghdad, failing to send in extra troops when needed, sending in officials with 
no experience, refusing to listen to the Iraqi population: all of these factors contributed to the 
unsuccessful ‘rebuilding’ of Iraq. The first two orders that Bremer issued, however, were to have 
the most grievous and long-lasting consequences.  
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CPA Orders 1 and 2 
On the 16th of May, Bremer issued CPA Order 1: the disestablishment of the Ba’ath party. 
This order officially removed the party’s leadership from positions of authority and responsibility 
in society, and eliminated the party’s infrastructure.95 The reason for this decision, the CPA states, 
was to ensure that once a new Iraqi government would take place, it would not be threatened by 
“Ba’athist elements returning to power and that those in positions of authority in the future are 
acceptable to the people of Iraq.”96 The order stated that government officials would be removed 
from their positions, banned from future employment in the public sector, and that senior party 
members would be evaluated for criminal conduct.97 The order demanded a thorough investigation 
into party members: individuals from the top three layers of management in every government 
ministry or other government institutions, such as universities and hospitals, were to be 
interviewed for possible affiliation with the Ba’ath party and subject to investigation for criminal 
conduct.98 Finally, the order prohibited the display of “the image or likeness of Saddam Hussein” 
in public spaces or government buildings, and offered rewards for information leading to the 
capture of senior Ba’ath party members.99 
 A week later, on the 23rd of May, Bremer signed CPA order 2: the dissolution of entities, 
also known as the disbanding of the Iraqi army. The order was incredibly thorough: it dismissed 
any person employed by a “Dissolved Entity”, effective immediately.100 Except for senior party 
members, members of the dissolved entities were to receive a termination payment, and pensions 
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being paid by a dissolved entity would continue to be paid.101 The dissolved entities include nearly 
all government institutions, military and paramilitary organizations, and several other 
organizations, such as: The Ministries of Defense, Information, and State for Military Affairs; the 
Intelligence Service and National Security Bureau; the Army, Air Force, Navy, Air Defense Force 
and other regular military services; the Republican Guard; the Presidential Secretariat; the National 
Assembly; the Revolutionary Command Council; the Revolutionary, Special and National 
Security Courts, and many others.102 In other words, CPA Order 2 ordered the dismissal of 
thousands of Iraqis from paid employment – estimates range between 50000 and 100000.103 This 
long list of organizations highlights how vast and all-encompassing the de-Ba’athification order 
was, especially in light of the previous chapter which highlighted how crucial Ba’ath party 
structure was to maintaining stability in Iraq.  
 
Execution of orders 
In order to execute these policies, the CPA established the de-Ba’athification council. This 
council, which was tasked with overseeing the de-Ba’athification, was headed by an Iraqi exile 
named Ahmed Chalabi. Chalabi, who had not been to Iraq since 1958 and was considered by many 
in the State Department to be corrupt and untrustworthy, had been instrumental in the Bush 
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administration’s decision to invade Iraq.104 However, while the Bush administration was under the 
impression that as an Iraqi, Chalabi knew what was going on inside Iraq, Chalabi was in it 
primarily for personal gain: he wanted to be Iraq’s new leader once Saddam Hussein had been 
removed. It is not surprising that the intelligence on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction that he 
provided to the administration turned out to be false.105 Moreover, Chalabi had convinced the 
administration that the Iraqi people were ready for regime change and would welcome the 
Americans as liberators and heroes, and that as Iraq’s new leader, he would even be willing to 
make peace with Israel.106 The Bush administration, desperately seeking for Iraqis to tell them 
what they wanted to hear and find ways to legitimize their invasion, was ready to give Chalabi the 
power he was after.  
As head of the de-Ba’athification council, Chalabi used his position in order to eliminate 
political rivals. According to one general, Chalabi’s hatred for the Ba’ath party and his own desire 
to play a powerful role in post-war Iraq made him the “worst possible choice”.107 In implementing 
the CPA’s order, Chalabi even went beyond what the order had stipulated, by excluding far more 
Ba’ath officials than the order itself had prescribed.108 The appointment of Chalabi as head of the 
de-Ba’athification council is characteristic for many of the decisions made by the CPA: 
underqualified people were often put in charge and there was little supervision. CIA Director 
Tenet, who was left out of the de-Ba’athification decision-making process, blames the CPA for 
most of these mistakes. “The CPA was not being staffed with people with the requisite skills to 
enable our success. Many possessed the right political credentials but were unschooled in the 
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complicated ways of the Middle East.”109 Moreover, most CPA employees had never worked 
abroad, and even senior decision-makers had no particular interest in the Middle East or 
understanding of Iraqi society, and some ended up committing abuses or fraud, such as over-
billing, contracting scams, and misappropriating funds from the U.S. treasury.110 Hardly any 
experienced staff members from the State Department were allowed to accompany Bremer to 
Baghdad.111 This lack of experience generated misperceptions and miscalculations about how to 
manage the post-war chaos, and eventually contributed to the disastrous outcome.112  
 
The decision-making process 
Bremer executed both de-Ba’athification orders despite objections by other officials, who 
favored a less rigorous order.113 Jay Garner, Bremer’s predecessor and senior CIA staff member 
in Iraq, stated that the de-Ba’athification was “so deep that we weren’t able to get the government 
running as efficiently and fast as we should have.”114 CPA order 1 caused people from a whole 
range of different government branches to suddenly find themselves unemployed – from doctors 
and engineers to elementary school librarians.115 Order 2, the disbanding of the military and other 
government institutions, rendered unemployed nearly half a million armed and militarily trained 
men –further fueling the insurgency that the U.S. were trying to combat. It is not surprising that 
citizens who suddenly no longer had a means to support their family, turned to demonstrations and 
violent insurgency. Prior to the issuing of this order, Colonel Paul Hughes stated that some Iraqi 
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military divisions had even offered their help in managing the post-war chaos, but these offers 
were ignored by Bremer.116 In other words, Bremer refused to consider to what extent the Iraqi 
army could still be of use in managing the post-war situation. David attributes the mistakes made 
by Bremer to what he refers to as the “single worst decision” of President Bush: putting the 
Pentagon in charge of post-war management rather than the State Department, which had been 
given that job in similar situations in the past.117  
As previously stated, the decisions for both CPA order 1 and 2 were made against the 
judgment of Garner and the military leadership, and without consultation with other senior 
government officials, such as the CIA Director or the National Security Advisor.118 Even Secretary 
of State Condoleezza Rice was unaware: “The concept was that we would defeat the army, but the 
institutions would hold, everything from ministries to police forces.”119 President Bush and 
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld both deny to have constructed it. Based on the available evidence, 
then, it is likely to conclude that de-Ba’athification had been designed by “Bremer in consultation 
with a handful of leading neo-conservatives who were determined to oust the quasi-socialist 
Ba’athist state and to demonstrate not only their military might, but also that their model of free 
market democracy was the ultimate form of human governance.”120 Considering how much 
knowledge and expertise was left out of the decision-making process, it is not surprising that the 
U.S. was met with so many challenges after the invasion. The series of mistakes committed during 
the decision-making process demonstrate how “the U.S. distinguished itself more by its blindness 
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and incompetence than its shrewdness and strategic vision.”121 In fact, due to this problematic 
decision-making process, the U.S. often acted against its own interest, the most prominent example 
being the fueling of the insurgency after issuing the de-Ba’athification orders.  
What is perhaps most striking about the decision-making process and the execution of the 
de-Ba’athification policy is that it could have been otherwise. There was no lack of information, 
and plenty of warnings and predictions were issued to alert the decision-makers, both from within 
and outside of the U.S. government.122 In April 2002, over a hundred experts from several federal 
agencies and more than 240 Iraqi leaders assembled for the “Future of Iraq Project”, and together 
produced a 2000-page report on what would need to be done to stabilize Iraq.123 For example, the 
group warned against a total de-Ba’athification that does not allow for reintegration of Ba’athists 
into society, and suggested that “it is not possible to equate Ba’ath party membership with 
criminalization.”124 There was elaborate discussion on whether or not to ban the Ba’ath party: 
some jurists stated that it would be merely symbolic since people joined the Ba’ath party for 
practical rather than ideological reasons; others insisted that there was nothing inherently offensive 
about the Ba’ath party’s ideology, and that it would be more successful to question or dismiss 
certain high-ranking officials, rather than all party members.125 The Future of Iraq Project also 
discussed alternatives to the de-Ba’athification policy such as forced resigning and then reapplying 
of Ba’ath officials in certain positions, allowing some former Ba’ath members to reintegrate into 
society whilst not doing away with their knowledge and expertise.126 Moreover, while some 
working groups endorsed de-Ba’athification, they did stress that such a policy should not “consist 
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of the total abolition of the current administration, since, in addition to its role of social control, 
that structure does provide a framework for social order.”127 The Democratic Principles and 
Procedures Working Group warned that a failure to reintegrate former Ba’athists into society, most 
notably members of the Iraqi army, could destabilize Iraq.128 Their recommendations were ignored 
by the Pentagon.  
This is just one example129 of many attempts to inform policy-makers of the obstacles and 
difficulties that the U.S. would face after invading Iraq.130 However, like most of these cases, the 
information either did not make its way to the decision-makers, or failed to set off alarm bells.131 
Some reports were deliberately ignored – even those by respected think-tanks and the U.S. War 
College, which concluded that “the threat posed by the Hussein regime was negligible compared 
with the problems that would ensue from its fall.”132 Many of the mistakes made after the invasion 
can thus be attributed not to a lack of knowledge, but rather, to the faulty decision-making process: 
“The hasty consensus among the decision-makers, the inadequate discussion of available options, 
the lack of structured debate, the recommendations too frequently left unchallenged, and the 
President’s scant engagement with, and interest in, the situation.”133 There was an abundance of 
information, but a lack of planning and willingness to take this information into account. 
Altogether, Bremer and the CPA failed to understand the importance of new leadership in Iraq; 
the lack of room for Iraqi participation in the transition process; the failure to reach out to the 
discontented Sunni representatives; and the failure to develop a strategy in order to counter the 
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insurgency.134 As a 2005 report by the RAND Corporation noted: “Post-conflict stabilization and 
reconstruction were addressed only very generally, largely because of the prevailing view that the 
task would not be difficult.”135  
After demonstrating the many mistakes that have been made, it begs the question of why 
the U.S. would go into such a costly and dangerous war without a plan for the post-war situation, 
and without paying careful attention to the decision-making process. It is therefore interesting to 
take a brief look at David’s analysis of the decision-making process, which states that the decision-
makers had:  
(1) A collective sense of invulnerability; (2) overestimated their ability to 
control events; (3) tended to have a very high opinion of themselves and to 
believe in their own moral superiority; (4) adopted a biased interpretation of the 
facts and filtered out any that did not match their view of reality; (5) had a 
stereotypical view of Saddam Hussein’s regime; (6) constantly justified their 
decisions, to the point of self-censorship; (7) practiced “bolstering”, i.e. 
focusing on some facts at the expense of others; and (8) exerted pressure for 
conformity.136 
Moreover, in the case of the CPA, only good news was given credence and disclosed, and bad 
news was simply ignored, which greatly contributed to worsening the situation in Iraq.137  
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Conclusion 
When analyzing the decision-making process regarding the de-Ba’athification policy and 
the subsequent execution of these orders, it is not surprising that the CPA’s de-Ba’athification 
caused great problems for Iraq and the U.S. occupation of it. De-Ba’athification resulted in 
insufficient security to carry on daily life and undermined the necessary infrastructure for social 
and economic activity.138 Moreover, it alienated hundreds of thousands of Iraqis who could now 
no longer support themselves or their families, effectively creating insurgents, many of whom had 
weapons or had been trained to use them.139  
Based on the available evidence, this chapter has demonstrated that the mistakes that were 
made can be blamed not on a lack of available information, but on a decision-making process 
which wilfully ignored information and warnings and excluded both U.S. and Iraqi officials with 
knowledge and experience regarding Iraq. By putting unqualified and corrupt officials like Bremer 
and Chalabi in charge of important decisions, the U.S. seemed to have been setting Iraq up for 
failure. Moreover, Iraqis were denied the opportunity to rebuild their own country – they were 
excluded from the decision-making process and, by disbanding the army and other government 
and military institutions, from rebuilding the country and managing the post-war chaos. As the 
following chapters will demonstrate, the poor design, execution, and implementation of the de-
Ba’athification orders were to have long-lasting consequences that severely destabilized Iraq and 
prevented the successful rebuilding of the Iraqi state.  
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Chapter 3 – Sectarianism and State Collapse:  
Setting the Stage for Daesh 
 
The previous two chapters have provided important background information from which 
to further analyze the relationship between de-Ba’athification and Daesh, which is what the 
following two chapters will be dedicated to. Both chapters will focus on these orders separately: 
Chapter 3 will be dedicated to assessing the impact of CPA Order 1, the de-Ba’athification of the 
Iraqi state, while Chapter 4 will analyze the effects of CPA Order 2, the disbanding of the Iraqi 
army, on Iraqi society. The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate how the de-Ba’athification of 
the Iraqi state has created an environment from which Daesh could emerge.  
 
Daesh: Filling the vacuum of de-Ba’athification 
Knowing and understanding the history of Daesh is important in order to understand how 
its emergence relates to de-Ba’athification and the subsequent state collapse Iraq experienced. 
Daesh was founded in 2004 by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi under the name of Al-Qaeda fi bilad al-
rafidayn: Al-Qaeda in the land of the two rivers, also known as Al Qaeda in Iraq.140 It entered the 
security vacuum left by the U.S. invasion of Iraq,  took advantage of an increased sense of Sunni 
alienation from the Shia-dominated government, and soon became a significant actor in the 
insurgency against the U.S. army.141 A report by the Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism 
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Information Center divides the establishment and emergence of Daesh in Iraq into four separate 
stages: 
1. Stage One (2004-2006): A new branch of Al-Qaeda in Iraq is established by Al-
Zarqawi, a Jordanian who joined the insurgents fighting the U.S. army after its 
occupation of Iraq in 2003. In 2004, Al-Zarqawi’s organization declared its allegiance 
to Osama bin Laden and becomes the first branch of Al Qaeda to be established beyond 
the borders of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Zarqawi’s main objectives were to harm U.S. 
forces and Shia Iraqis, target efforts at reconstructing Iraq by attacking aid workers and 
contractors, discourage Iraqi cooperation with the U.S. by attacking government 
infrastructure and personnel, and draw the U.S. into a sectarian war by focusing 
specifically on Shia targets. Al-Zarqawi’s strategy was criticized by Osama bin Laden: 
his tactics caused many civilian casualties, and Bin Laden feared that this would result 
in decreased support for Al-Qaeda throughout the region. Al-Zarqawi’s ideology 
differed from that of Al-Qaeda, in particular for his exceptional hostility towards the 
Shia population of Iraq, and Al-Zarqawi’s relations with the leadership of Al-Qaeda 
began to deteriorate. This first stage ended when Al-Zarqawi was killed in 2006 in a 
targeted American airstrike.142  
2. Stage Two (2006-2011): In October 2006, an umbrella network for jihadi organizations 
is established, known as the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI). This new organization was a 
collaboration of Al-Qaeda in Iraq with several other Sunni jihadist organizations, 
intended to reestablish Al-Qaeda’s power after the death of Al-Zarqawi. The ISI was 
active mainly in western Iraq, where the majority of Iraq’s Sunni’s live. Aside from 
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attacking U.S. forces and the Shia population, it began to establish a Sunni-led civilian 
administration as an alternative to the central Shia government. The power of the ISI 
declined between 2008 and 2011 when the U.S. launched a military campaign against 
it in 2007, known as “the surge”. The U.S. established “awakening councils” (also 
known as sahwa), groups of Sunni tribesmen who assisted them in their fight against 
ISI and received large financial compensation for it. However, when the U.S. 
withdrawal from Iraq began to approach in 2011, the amount of aid the councils 
received began to decrease and the security situation deteriorated. At the same time, the 
Shia central government became increasingly sectarian. This prepared the ground for 
those Sunni tribes to later join Daesh in their campaign against the Iraqi regime.143   
3. Stage Three (2012-June 2014): After the U.S. army withdrew from Iraq in December 
2011, it left (another) military-security vacuum which allowed ISI to regain strength 
and renew its campaign against the Iraqi government and the Shia population, 
successfully encouraging a civil war between the Sunni and Shia populations of Iraq. 
Simultaneously, ISI established its presence in Syria, where the anti-regime protests 
rapidly transformed into a civil war. In April 2013, after the unrest in Syria had allowed 
ISI to expand there, ISI changed its name to “Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham”. In 
January 2014, Daesh managed to defeat the Iraqi army in Fallujah and Ramadi. Several 
months later, in June, Daesh seized control of Iraq’s second-largest city, Mosul.144  
4. Stage Four (as of June 2014): Daesh begins making large military achievements, such 
as the takeover of Mosul. Public disagreements between al-Nusra, Daesh and al-Qaeda 
continue, and eventually Daesh publicly distanced itself from the Al-Qaeda leadership 
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and Al-Nusra. In September 2014, the United States and its allies launched a campaign 
against Daesh.145 
 
As can clearly be seen from the above stages, Daesh acted upon security and political 
vacuums that resulted from the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Important factors in the rapid emergence of 
Daesh are improper governance and increased sectarianism and Sunni alienation as a result of de-
Ba’athification, all of which will be expanded upon in this chapter. The next sections will focus 
specifically on the political domain, by discussing Iraqi state collapse, and the subsequent improper 
rebuilding of the Iraqi state. More specifically, it will now turn to discussing the collapse of the 
Iraqi state, how this collapse was caused by de-Ba’athification, and how it, in turn, facilitated the 
above explained rise of Daesh.  
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3.1 – State survival and state collapse:  
Framing the consequences of de-Ba’athification 
The failings of the Iraqi state’s security and post-war political system became especially 
apparent when Daesh managed to seize control of Iraq’s second largest city, Mosul, in June 2014. 
How was it possible for an insurgent group to completely overtake state control in such a large 
city? This crisis has its roots in the failing of Iraq’s post-war political system. This subchapter will 
demonstrate how Daesh’s ability to seize control of Mosul and other major Iraqi cities is illustrative 
of “a wider comparative dynamic of violence brought on by a reduction in state power and social 
alienation caused by discriminatory political, economic and social systems.”146 The power vacuum 
from which Daesh could emerge as a strong alternative to the central government was primarily 
the result of state collapse facilitated by de-Ba’athification.  
State collapse is the breakdown of good governance, law, and order.147 According to 
William Zartman, professor at Johns Hopkins University, a state relies on three key elements for 
survival. First, it must be able to control coercion across its territory.148 In order to achieve this, a 
state must impose order upon its citizens and maintain a monopoly on the use of force, through 
developing coercive institutions such as the military and the police.149 “Without the state to act as 
a central authority, general lawlessness is likely to prevail, as individuals are freed from the threat 
of coercion and institutional restraint.”150 Chapter 1 demonstrated the Ba’ath party’s control over 
Iraq, and how it kept its population under central authority through a system of punishment and 
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reward and the threat of violence. By removing all central government and military and coercive 
authority, de-Ba’athification eradicated this system overnight, encouraging lawlessness, looting, 
and violence. 
Second, a state must be able to deliver the basic goods and services that citizens need in 
their daily lives and facilitate the infrastructure necessary to do so.151 This is the state’s 
infrastructural power, a concept introduced by historical sociologist Michael Mann, who defined 
it as the state’s “institutional capacity (…) to penetrate its territories and logistically implement 
decisions.”152 Infrastructural power is important in granting the state legitimacy: it allows the state 
to provide its citizens with basic needs such as electricity, sewage networks and clean water, and 
to establish government institutions and communications and transportation networks that allow it 
to deliver these services.153 By disbanding nearly all government institutions, the de-
Ba’athification orders destroyed the Iraqi state’s infrastructural power and made citizens turn to 
informal channels in order to obtain the support that the state used to provide them with.154 This 
process simultaneously simultaneously further eroded state authority and legitimacy.155 To an 
extent, this helps explain the emergence of Daesh: in many cases, they were able to act upon the 
vacuum left by the state and provide citizens with such services. After seizing control over new 
territory, Daesh’s first priority was often to restore basic services such as water and electricity, and 
provide citizens with food and security.156 Furthermore, state collapse often goes hand-in-hand 
with a (re-)emergence of secondary identity traits.157 “During times of insecurity, individuals will 
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often align with the political or religious grouping that provides them with the greatest chance of 
survival.”158  This not only allowed Daesh to exploit ethnic and sectarian tensions, but it also helps 
explain why the violent insurgency in Iraq quickly turned sectarian. Daesh not only utilized these 
sectarian identity traits, but also provided citizens with a sense of security that the government 
could not provide them with: “Local residents in (…) Mosul and other cities say that Daesh is 
acting like a rudimentary functioning state and providing security.”159 For example, citizens in 
Mosul reported that Daesh was handing out food and ensuring pensions of veterans be paid out, 
after the government had failed to do so for years.160 As such, the state’s failure to provide its 
citizens with basic goods and services has both encouraged citizens to seek security elsewhere and 
strengthened notions of sectarian identity traits, further contributing to an environment that 
allowed for the emergence of a violent sectarian organization like Daesh.  
The final pillar of state survival is a unified national identity, and the state’s ability to 
develop an ideology that binds the population together and to the state.161 “The ideology of a state 
seeks to separate itself from, amalgamate and then rise above tribal, religious, ethnic and class 
identities that it competes with for the loyalty of the population.”162 Once a state collapses, a central 
point of identity is removed, and politics, economics, and identity “quickly become localized 
without a national identity to act as a force for social cohesion.”163 Nevertheless, this pillar of state 
survival is arguably less important than the ones previously discussed. Chapter 1 has demonstrated 
that it is questionable whether the Ba’ath party’s ideology was actually popular among the 
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population and that citizens most likely joined the party for the practical benefits it provided them 
with. Although it was not ideological in nature, Ba’ath party membership still unified the 
population to an extent: By providing benefits to its members, the party brought the population 
together under the banner of a single ideology and in turn, brought the population closer to the 
state by infiltrating their daily lives. As such, the example of Iraq demonstrates that a state does 
not necessarily need a unified national identity in order to survive. The Ba’ath party’s ideology 
was therefore not a particularly essential component to the Iraqi state’s power and as such, the 
consequences of disbanding the Ba’ath party were practical rather than ideological. It appears the 
increased sectarianism in the Iraqi insurgency and Iraqi politics was primarily a result of the 
security vacuum left by de-Ba’athification rather than the disappearance of state ideology – after 
all, if secondary identity traits had been completely removed by a dominant state ideology, the 
insurgency would not have turned sectarian so quickly.  
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3.2 – Case study:  
How Iraq’s political system facilitated the insurgency  
The Iraqi political system post-2003 
After CPA Order 1 was issued, and all Ba’ath members were removed from senior 
positions in government and most government institutions disbanded, Bremer established the Iraqi 
Governing Council (IGC). This council was to be the new government of Iraq and consisted largely 
of exiled Iraqi politicians.164 The new government was supposed to be a more accurate 
representation of the diversity of the Iraqi population: while Saddam Hussein was a Sunni Muslim, 
as were most government officials, the majority of the Iraqi population is Shia, who often faced 
discrimination under Saddam Hussein’s rule.165 In an attempt to accurately represent different 
religious groups within Iraqi society, the IGC included more Shias than Sunnis, as well as 
representatives of Iraq’s Kurdish and Assyrian Christian minorities. In June 2004, both the IGC 
and the CPA were dissolved and power was transferred to the new Iraqi interim government. A 
year later, in 2005, the interim government was replaced by the Iraqi Transitional Government, 
which was tasked with drafting a new constitution for Iraq.  In December 2005, the first elections 
were held in Iraq since the overthrow of the Ba’ath regime, and in May 2006, the first permanent 
government of Iraq was established under the leadership of Nouri al-Maliki. In what was generally 
considered an attempt to improve sectarian tensions in Iraq by promoting inclusivity, the U.S. 
established a system of government known as muhasasa.  
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Muhasasa: How sectarianism was launched into Iraqi politics 
Since the formation of the IGC, Iraqi politics have been organized around a system referred 
to as muhasasa (meaning inclusivity, or the sharing of quotas). The muhasasa system, introduced 
to Iraqi politics by the U.S., involves the equal distribution of cabinet seats among representatives 
of Iraq’s different religious and ethnic communities.166 “Cabinet posts, along with the positions of 
prime minister and president, are allocated in line with a sectarian formula that also takes into 
account the number of seats each party wins in the election.”167 However, the muhasasa system 
was counterproductive: it only emphasized differences between groups and encouraged politicians 
to act upon those differences in order to maximize their own political gain. While this system was 
intended to distribute power equally among different groups in society, it essentially encouraged 
the political use of sectarian discourse and led to the marginalization of minorities. “This 
intensification of identity politics led to a vicious cycle of polarization between Sunnis and 
Shias.”168 During elections, the system allowed for overly sectarian rhetoric to dominate the 
elections and the process of government formation.169 The muhasasa system and the increased 
sectarianism that accompanied it further divided the Iraqi population into ethnic and religiously 
affiliated groups, a tactic that was used by many political parties to increase support and 
mobilization.170 Furthermore, the muhasasa system has fueled Sunni alienation: in a 2014 poll, 
66% of Sunni respondents considered the Iraqi government to be illegitimate and its decisions 
wrong, as compared to 31% of the Shia respondents.171 The muhasasa system has thus been an 
important factor in contributing to the the marginalization of Iraq’s Sunni minority and their 
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exclusion from politics, and it has therefore contributed to creating circumstances that encouraged 
the rise of a violent insurgency.  
The emergence of violent extremism in Iraq, including the rise of Daesh and their ability 
to seize control of several Iraqi cities, can be attributed to an extent to the failings of Iraq’s postwar 
system. By failing to adequately fill the power vacuum left by the de-Ba’athification of Iraq, and 
subsequently failing to rebuild the Iraqi state and political system and instead imposing a flawed 
system of government which encouraged sectarianism and Sunni alienation, the U.S.’s de-
Ba’athification policy has created a violent and unstable environment that allowed for sectarian 
violence and terrorism to emerge from. 
 
Iraq under Maliki: 2006-2014 
Under Maliki’s leadership, sectarian tensions in Iraq increased and the alienation of the 
Sunni community continued. It is not a coincidence that, also in 2006, sectarian violence in Iraq 
sparked to such a high level that some referred to it as a “civil war”. Maliki’s government severely 
undermined all three previously discussed conditions for state survival. First, he weakened the 
state’s ability to achieve a necessary level of coercion, by failing to impose order upon the 
population or establish a monopoly on the use of force.172 If anything, Maliki’s improper 
rebuilding of the military and his appointing of officials loyal to him rather than those who were 
competent has greatly attributed to the eventual Iraqi state collapse. This condition will be 
discussed at length in Chapter 4.  
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Perhaps the condition most severely damaged by Maliki’s rule is the state’s ability to 
deliver goods and services. For example, many areas in Iraq still faced electricity and water 
shortages as a result of the U.S. invasion, and many roads had never been rebuilt.173 The root cause 
of Maliki’s failure to improve these conditions is corruption. By 2006, corruption had reached such 
a high level that it directly obstructed both the state’s infrastructural power and its ability to 
continue reconstruction efforts.174 A 2011 United Nations estimate claimed that only 26% of the 
Iraqi population was covered by the public sewage networks, and approximately one-third of the 
population lacked electrical supply.175 This large-scale corruption not only undermined the state’s 
ability to improve the delivery of goods and services to its citizens, but also created a deep sense 
of alienation from the state and maintained “the widespread perception that the state is being 
governed only to the benefit of a small kleptocracy.”176  
The government’s failure to provide basic goods and services to its citizens is not 
inherently a sectarian problem. However, the combination of these two problems – increased 
sectarianism as a result of the muhasasa system and the lack of many basic infrastructural needs – 
laid the groundwork for greater sectarian tensions over the distribution of resources, goods, and 
services.177 Because the state failed to provide its citizens with services necessary for survival, 
parts of the Iraqi population had to find other solutions to maintain security and be provided with 
such services.178 This lack of the provision of basic goods and services, combined with overall 
sectarian tensions, allowed religious and political groups to step in where the state had failed. 
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“These entrepreneurial groups justified their actions in sectarian terms, and gained political support 
by exploiting the population’s needs, providing political, coercive, and economic leadership.”179  
 
Sunni alienation 
The third condition for state survival, developing an ideology that can bind the people 
together and to the state, was also undermined by Maliki’s rule. By the time Maliki came to power, 
as a result of years of little to no governance, the Iraqi population was already heavily divided 
along sectarian lines, and ethnic and religious violence was widespread. Maliki did little to mend 
the nation’s growing sectarian rift, “eventually overcompensating for his lack of experience (…) 
by turning towards increased authoritarianism.”180 Weary of losing power, Maliki centered all 
power around himself, appointing people loyal to him to the highest offices and cracking down on 
any attempts at opposition. Because of Maliki’s poor leadership and use of divisive rhetoric, the 
new Iraqi government had difficulties eliminating the insurgency that had begun as a result of the 
U.S. invasion. Maliki’s authoritarian policies and the Iraqi military’s incompetence181 prevented 
the insurgency in Sunni-majority areas from being countered, providing these groups with 
opportunities to regroup and spread.182 Rather than strengthening and securing Iraq, Maliki’s 
authoritarian and sectarian politics have alienated both the Kurdish and Sunni minorities. From 
having Sunni politicians arrested to the violent crackdown of Sunni protests, Maliki sought to 
eliminate Sunni participation in Iraqi politics as much as possible.183 He frequently ordered the 
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arrest of Sunni government officials and was widely perceived, both domestically and by U.S. 
officials, to be unwilling to halt Shia militias targeting Iraqi Sunnis.184 Maliki encouraged feelings 
of disenfranchisement among Sunni Iraqis, and ignored their attempts to participate in politics. He 
privileged Shia Iraqis at the expense of other groups within Iraqi society, and many Sunni Iraqis 
felt that they were being discriminated against.185 There are many accounts of the Iraqi army going 
into Sunni neighborhoods after a violent incident and indiscriminately arresting individuals.186 
Rafi al-Issawi, a Sunni politician who acted as finance minister and deputy prime minister under 
Maliki, stated that Maliki had “thousands of Sunnis” arrested after U.S. withdrawal from Iraq in 
2011: “They come to any district with a car bombing, for example. They’re collecting 200, 300 
people and they stay in prison for years without a trial.”187  
Another example of Maliki alienating the Sunni community whilst simultaneously 
deteriorating the security situation in Iraq has to do with the “awakening councils” also known as 
sahwa. As discussed in the beginning of this chapter, these councils consisted of Sunni fighters 
and Islamist resistance groups and were founded by the U.S. in 2007 in an attempt to counter 
insurgent activity, in particular by ISI.188 However, Maliki had grown weary of arming the Sunnis, 
as it could grant them too much political and military power.189 He therefore sought to disintegrate 
the sahwa, first by putting them under control of the Iraqi authorities in 2010, and later by 
incorporating them into the Iraqi security sector.190 Once incorporated into government 
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institutions, sahwa members were offered low-rank and low-paid government jobs, further 
harming the relationship between the Shia government and its Sunni citizens.191  
The estrangement and isolation of Iraq’s Sunni community became especially apparent 
during Maliki’s last term from 2010 to 2014, when corruption continued to increase and Maliki 
continued blatantly arresting and imprisoning Sunni politicians, including his own vice-
president.192 During Maliki’s last term, there were frequent Sunni protests across the north-west 
of Iraq, the traditionally Sunni-dominated area. In December 2012, widespread protests began in 
Fallujah and soon spread to other Sunni-dominated cities after the Sunni finance minister’s home 
had been raided and his bodyguards arrested. The protests focused mainly on Maliki’s 
sectarianism, corruption, poor treatment of prisoners and overall poor government functioning. 
Iraqi security forces responded harshly, resulting in even more sectarian violence. Both the strong 
sense of Sunni estrangement and the lack of state power allowed Daesh to capitalize on sectarian 
identity traits, allowing them in 2014 to gain control of those areas where the protests occurred 
and where the government crackdown was harsh.    
The profound sense of alienation experienced by Iraq’s Sunni’s, facilitated by the muhasasa 
system and Maliki’s rule, has been a major driving force behind the emergence of Daesh. “Sunni 
Iraqis felt increasingly excluded from Iraqi politics, cut off from the benefits of oil wealth, and 
discriminated against by the Iraqi security forces.”193 The Iraqi state was weakened by Maliki’s 
attempts to monopolize power; his failure to fight corruption or provide social services to the 
population, his exclusionary policies and cultivation of sectarian identities.194 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that de-Ba’athification has allowed for the creation of an 
environment from which Daesh could emerge. It has shown how a multitude of factors have 
contributed to creating this environment, and has highlighted the connection between these 
different factors. It has demonstrated how de-Ba’athification has facilitated Iraqi state collapse, by 
removing all elements necessary for survival that had previously been present under Ba’ath party 
rule. The new Iraqi government did not meet any of the standards required for state survival: the 
weakness of the Iraqi army prevented it from being able to control its territory; corruption under 
Maliki’s government resulted in the state’s failure to deliver basic goods and services such as 
water, electricity, sewage networks and infrastructure to Iraqi citizens; and Maliki’s sectarianism 
prevented the state from developing a uniting ideology and instead, alienated the Sunni Muslims, 
who now had to turn elsewhere to seek the security that a state usually offers. The history of Daesh 
has demonstrated how Daesh acted upon these security and institutional vacuums in order to 
expand. Improper governance, increased sectarianism and the marginalization of Iraq’s Sunni 
community, the lack of any security apparatus or functioning state institutions: all of these factors 
came forth from de-Ba’athification and resulted in an ideal breeding ground for creating an 
insurgency and a possibility for groups like Daesh to step in where the government was failing. 
What is interesting to note here is that while Al Qaeda in Iraq, Daesh’s predecessor, was originally 
composed of people from many different nationalities, the share of Iraqis within AQI increased 
over time.195 The increased rate of Iraqis can thus be explained through a combination of the 
security vacuum that had emerged in Iraq and the increased sense of Sunni alienation.  
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This chapter has furthermore demonstrated the connection between de-Ba’athification and 
the creation of a breeding ground for Daesh by looking at the case study of Iraq’s political system, 
which changed Iraq’s political landscape and facilitated state collapse. The muhasasa system has 
fueled sectarianism across the political spectrum and increased Sunni alienation. By failing to 
adequately fill the power vacuum left by de-Ba’athification and instead introducing a system which 
fueled sectarianism, the U.S.’s de-Ba’athification policy has resulted in a violent and unstable 
environment from which Daesh could emerge. Maliki’s authoritarian and sectarian rule was a 
direct result of the muhasasa system, and contributed to the emergence of Daesh by both failing to 
properly rebuild the Iraqi state and by increasing the distance between the Shia government and 
the Sunni population. This increased sense of Sunni alienation stemmed mostly from their 
exclusion from Iraqi politics; the sectarian rhetoric used by Maliki; the arrests of and attacks on 
Sunni government representatives; the violent crackdown of Sunni protests; and Maliki’s failure 
to act against Shia militias targeting Sunni Muslims. This not only contributed to creating a 
breeding ground for Daesh, but also encouraged some Sunni Iraqis to join Daesh in their fight 
against Maliki’s government. In other words, de-Ba’athification has facilitated Iraqi state collapse 
which created an environment for insurgency; and the failure of Iraq’s post-war political system 
has further contributed to this environment, eventually allowing Daesh to seize control of large 
parts of Iraqi territory.  
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Chapter 4 – Military consequences of de-Ba’athification 
	
 This chapter focuses on how de-Ba'athification, on a direct and indirect military level, has 
contributed to creating the insurgents themselves and allowed them to gain control over large parts 
of Iraqi territory. The approach of this chapter is two-fold: it analyzes the direct effects of de-
Ba'athification in order to assess how it has created insurgents, and addresses the indirect effects 
of CPA Order 2 by looking at how the disbanding of the Iraqi army has facilitated the emergence 
of Daesh. Finally, it will use the fall of Mosul in 2014 as a case study to further demonstrate the 
connection between de-Ba'athification and the emergence of Daesh. 
 
 Disbanding the entire Iraqi military as well as other government institutions only 
intensified the insurgency that had begun as a result of the U.S. invasion of Iraq. While the 
insurgency thus originally came forth from the lawlessness as a result of the U.S. invasion, both 
the previous and current chapter demonstrate the crucial role de-Ba’athification has played in 
fueling the insurgency. In particular the CPA's decision to disband the Iraqi army before 
establishing a sufficient replacement of the Ba’ath party’s military and without including former 
Iraqi soldiers or civil servants contributed to the insurgency and created a security vacuum. Today, 
many senior U.S. officials state the disbanding of the army was unnecessary and 
counterproductive. By dismissing between 50000 and 100000 militarily trained men, the CPA not 
only pushed them toward the insurgency, but also made it harder to combat the insurgency. As a 
U.S. Army vice chief of staff said: "We began to slowly put together a security force, but it took 
far too much time and that gave the insurgency an ability to start to rise."196 In other words, CPA 
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Order 2 worsened the security situation in Iraq, fueled the insurgency and, specifically, contributed 
to creating the insurgents, by disbanding the Iraqi military and several other government 
institutions.  
 
4.1 – Connections between Ba’athists and Daesh 
 In order to assess how de-Ba'athification has contributed directly to Daesh by creating the 
insurgents, this section will look at former Ba'ath officials who became members of Al Qaeda in 
Iraq (AQI) and Daesh. While it is difficult to prove and trace individuals on a large scale, and little 
academic research has been conducted into the subject matter, there are several sources claiming 
there is a strong connection between former Ba'ath members and membership of AQI and Daesh 
after de-Ba'athification. Tønnessen, who wrote a paper in which he takes a closer look at the 
relationship between AQI and Daesh leadership, notes that "the top leadership of IS seems to have 
been populated by former Iraqi officers who were removed from their positions when the Iraqi 
army was disbanded in 2003."197 Multiple other sources, which will be discussed later in this 
chapter, confirm this claim. In fact, it appears that the two most common patterns in identifying 
the post-2010 leadership of Daesh is their backgrounds as either former Ba'ath officers or officials 
or former inmates of U.S.-led prisons in Iraq.198 Interesting to note here is that these prisons can 
be considered yet another contribution of the U.S. to the insurgency it helped create and 
simultaneously sought to counter. During the occupation of Iraq, U.S. armed forces tended to 
conduct mass sweeps of Sunni-dominated areas in their search for Ba'athists in hiding, 
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indiscriminately arresting any men of military age.199 Aside from contributing to Sunni alienation 
and a general mistrust against U.S. forces, these actions also contributed more directly to the 
emergence of Daesh. An interview with a senior commander in Daesh named Abu Ahmed tells 
the story of how much of the Daesh leadership met in a U.S.-led prison named Camp Bucca. While 
some prisoners had been detained for legitimate reasons, among them were also young men who 
had been taken from their towns by U.S. forces for no reason and, while in Camp Bucca, 
radicalized and joined the large jihadist network that had been established there.200 Among Camp 
Bucca's detainees was Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, current leader of Daesh, as well as several other 
individuals, some of them former Ba'athists, who would later acquire prominent positions among 
the Daesh leadership.201  
 
Ba’ath involvement in the Iraqi insurgency 
 The involvement of Ba’athists in the Iraqi insurgency can be seen going back all the way 
to AQI's predecessor Tawhid wal-Jihad, which was also lead by Al-Zarqawi. Much of this 
involvement relates to the "Return to Faith Campaign" (al-hamla al-imaniyya), an initiative 
launched by Saddam Hussein in the 1990's which sought to promote a more Islamist agenda in an 
attempt to counter the increasing Salafi trend in Iraq.202 During this period, the regime became 
increasingly Islamic and religion began to play a larger role within the Ba'ath party itself.203 While 
the campaign was intended to counter Salafi sentiments, it was not entirely successful in doing so, 
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and Salafism became increasingly popular especially within the military.204 Primary sources from 
AQI suggest that several of their Iraqi founding fathers were part of this underground Salafist 
group in the military, and were allegedly persecuted by Saddam Hussein's regime for their 
involvement.205 However, the Salafist trend in the Iraqi army mostly inspired officers of AQI, and 
not of Daesh: "An important difference (…) is that while the former officers of AQI left or were 
dismissed from the Iraqi army prior to the invasion of 2003, the former officers of IS seem to have 
remained in their positions until the old Iraqi army was dissolved following the invasion."206  
 
In other words, while AQI's officers came forth largely from the Salafist trend in the Iraqi 
army, this was not the case for Daesh officers who were still in the Iraqi army prior to de-
Ba'athification. As such, it can be assumed that they joined Daesh as a result of de-Ba'athification: 
not only had de-Ba'athification resulted in unemployment for Ba'ath officers, it had also 
encouraged Sunni alienation and facilitated state collapse from which Daesh benefited greatly. 
Moreover, it should be noted that few if any of the Daesh leadership belonged to this Salafist 
community, which further reinforces the argument that Ba'athists joined Daesh for strategic and 
practical reasons relating to de-Ba'athification rather than ideological ones.207 An important role 
in the formation of Daesh was played by Abu Bakr al-Iraqi, a former colonel in the Iraqi 
Revolutionary Guard and former Ba'athist, who in 2010 promoted several other former Ba'athists 
to leadership positions within Daesh and reorganized Daesh along a Ba'athist model.208 In a report 
citing uncovered documents in Syria, the German magazine Der Spiegel noted that Bakr drafted 
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up the blueprint for the Islamic Intelligence State, a "precise plan for (…) a caliphate run by an 
organization that resembled East Germany's notorious Stasi domestic intelligence agency."209 
Several accounts of former Daesh members also reinforce the notion that Daesh leadership is 
occupied by former Ba'athists. "Even with the influx of thousands of foreign fighters, almost all 
of the leaders of the Islamic State are former Iraqi officers, according to Iraqis, Syrians, and 
analysts who study the group."210 The Ba'athists have been able to help Daesh develop into a well-
organized organization, due to their organizational and military experience and the smuggling 
networks they developed as a result of the sanctions against Iraq.211  
 
 In particular after the issuing of CPA Order 2, several sources report a "marriage of 
convenience" between Ba'athists and members of AQI and later Daesh.212 Senior researcher at 
Human Rights Watch and journalist Letta Tayler stated that "Ba'athists got muscle from ISIS, and 
ISIS got local legitimacy through the Ba'athists."213 Important to note here is that this cooperation 
was not ideological in nature. The ideologies of the Ba'ath party and AQI and Daesh had little in 
common, and therefore their cooperation was merely strategic in nature: "Tactical cooperation is 
conceivable given their common goal of destabilizing and removing the new U.S.-installed regime 
in Iraq."214 Ba'athists loyal to the regime took the lead in resisting the U.S.-led occupation of Iraq 
which they perceived as unjust, and ideology played a less important role than their common goal 
of destabilizing the U.S. occupation.215 In an interview in 2005, director of the Iraqi National 
																																																													
209 Mark Perry, "Fighting Saddam All Over Again", Politico, 28 April 2015. 
210 Liz Sly, "The Hidden Hand Behind the Islamic State's Militants? Saddam Hussein's", The Washington Post, 4 
April 2015. 
211 Ibid. 
212 Tønnessen, "Heirs of Zarqawi or Saddam?", n.p.  
213 Shane Harris, "The Re-Ba'athification of Iraq", Foreign Policy, 21 August 2014. 
214 Tønnessen, "Heirs of Zarqawi or Saddam?", n.p.  
215 Mohammed Hafez, Suicide Bombers in Iraq: The Strategy and Ideology of Martyrdom (Washington: United 
States Institute of Peace, 2007), 47. 
59 
	
Intelligence Agency Muhammad Abdullah al-Shahwani stated that he strongly believed that 
former Ba'athists are a dominant force in the Iraqi insurgency, citing their organizational and 
military skills as the primary reason for the Ba'ath party members’ important role in the 
insurgency.216 Aside from the previously cited tactical and strategic reasons for Ba'athists to join 
Daesh, it would also make little sense for them to join Daesh for ideological reasons, considering 
that the ideologies of Daesh and the Ba’ath party have little in common. Former Ba’athists who 
adhered to the Ba’ath party’s ideology would have been better off with insurgent groups that do 
propagate this ideology, such as the Men of the Army of the al-Naqshbandia Order (commonly 
abbreviated as JRTN), whose ideology is a mixture of Ba'athism and pan-Arabism, or the General 
Military Council for Iraqi Revolutionaries (GMCIR), a Ba’athist militant group.217 There were 
thus were many alternatives to Daesh for Ba’athists who wanted to join the insurgency out of 
ideological convictions. As such, it makes little sense to assume that Ba'athists joined Daesh or 
AQI for ideological reasons, and rather reinforces the previously made argument that a lack of 
state security and Sunni alienation as a result of de-Ba'athification and the mass dismissal of 
Ba’athists are the main drivers behind the emergence of Daesh.  
 
 Iraq analyst Sajad Jiyad stated that Daesh "would not exist without former Ba'athists".218 
The table below demonstrates direct evidence of Ba'ath involvement in Daesh that reinforces this 
statement. It is based on several sources and shows current well-known Daesh leadership, whether 
or not they were Ba'ath party members, and what positions they held in both the Ba’ath party and 
Daesh.  
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Name Nationality Former 
Ba'ath 
Position in Ba'ath Position in Daesh 
Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi 
Iraqi  n/a Current leader 
Abu Omar al-
Baghdadi 
Iraqi X Officer in the Iraqi 
army 
Former leader; Abu 
Bakr al-Baghdadi's 
predecessor 
Abu Muslim al-
Turkmani 
Iraqi X Colonel in military 
intelligence, 
Republican Guard 
Al-Baghdadi's 
deputy until his 
death in 2015 
Abu Muhammad al-
Adnani 
Syrian  n/a Senior leadership 
Abu Bakr al-Iraqi Iraqi X Army colonel Al-Baghdadi's 
closest advisor until 
his death in 2014 
Abu Ali al-Anbari Iraqi X Major general in 
the Iraqi army 
Al-Baghdadi's 
deputy in Syria 
Muhammad al-
Nada al-Juburi 
Iraqi X unknown unknown 
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Abu Ayman al-Iraqi Iraqi X Colonel in air force 
intelligence 
Senior leadership, 
possible military 
council member 
Abu Ahmad al-
Alwani 
Iraqi X Soldier in Iraqi 
army 
Member of military 
council 
Abu Abd al-
Rahman al-Bilawi 
Iraqi  n/a Head of military 
council 
Abu Suleyman Unknown  n/a Minister of war 
Abu Faysal al-
Zayidi 
Iraqi X unknown unknown 
Abu Wahib Iraqi  n/a Senior military 
commander 
 
Table 1.1: Correlation between Daesh leadership and Ba'ath membership 2010-2015.219  
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This table has been compiled from multiple sources as well as independent research. The names listed above are the 
most prominent and well-known leadership of Daesh in Iraq. Because this thesis focuses solely on Daesh in Iraq, I 
have excluded those individuals who work exclusively in Syria. (For further reading into Daesh leadership in Syria, 
see: Charles Lister, “Profiling the Islamic State”, Brookings Doha Center Analysis Paper, 1 December 2014.) The 
table contains those members most well-known for their role in Daesh and whose legitimacy and background has 
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 The data in this table demonstrate that there were relationships existing prior to de-
Ba'athification on a military level among the current leadership of Daesh. It also shows that the 
majority of Daesh leadership are former Ba'ath members. As such, this table demonstrates direct 
evidence of the relationship between de-Ba'athification and the emergence of Daesh. Combined 
with what this section has previously established, namely that Ba'ath members joined Daesh for 
strategic reasons, that a former Ba'athist created the blueprint for Daesh's structure and 
organization and appointed Ba'athists to leadership positions, and that de-Ba'athification 
encouraged Sunni alienation and state collapse allowing Daesh to become a powerful player in 
Iraq, the direct connection between Daesh and Ba'ath party members further reinforces the 
connection between de-Ba’athification and Daesh. In fact, it provides direct evidence of this 
chapter’s main argument, namely that de-Ba'athification has fueled the insurgency by creating the 
insurgents. If it were not for de-Ba'athification, Ba'athists would not have lost their jobs, the Sunni 
community would not have felt alienated, the Iraqi state would not have collapsed and a subsequent 
security vacuum would not have been created.  
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4.2 – Indirect effects of military de-Ba’athification 
 CPA Order 2 also had indirect consequences that fueled the insurgency and facilitated the 
emergence of Daesh. As discussed in Chapter 3, Maliki's sectarian and divisive rule severely 
undermined all conditions necessary for state survival. One condition in particular will be 
discussed in this chapter because it relates to CPA Order 2, the disbanding of the Iraqi army: the 
state's ability to control coercion across its territory and maintain a monopoly on the use of force.  
 
 After having disbanded the Iraqi army in 2003, the CPA sought to reestablish the state's 
coercive capacity and hastily rebuilt the Iraqi army. However, the haste with which the army was 
rebuilt has resulted in a weak and divided military force.220 Like many other Iraqi institutions, the 
military was plagued by corruption. For example, in late 2014 it was revealed that the Iraqi army 
had been paying salaries of at least fifty thousand ‘ghost’ soldiers – meaning they paid the salaries 
of people who were not actually in military service.221 Moreover, by directly interfering in the 
armed forces, Maliki broke their coherence and gained personal influence over the chain of 
command.222 "Following his appointment as prime minister in 2006, he worked to successfully 
'coup-proof' the army, binding its senior commanders and paramilitary units to him personally, 
and subverting the formal chain of command."223 In an attempt to prevent subversion, coup-
proofing discourages cooperation between different elements in the military because it encourages 
them to compete.224 For example, Maliki appointed officers who were loyal to him but otherwise 
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incompetent or accused of crimes against the population.225 Furthermore, Maliki exploited the fact 
that there was little political oversight over the army in order to strengthen his control over the 
armed forces.226 Maliki brought the Office of the Commander in Chief, an organization established 
by American advisors as a coordinating forum, under personal control and used it for his own 
political gain, by appointing allies to key positions and issuing orders directly to its officers, 
undermining the army's chain of command.227 Corruption in the form of bribery also plagued Iraq's 
army structure, as a former Captain in the Iraqi army stated: "You don't earn a commanding 
position; you buy it."228 Moreover, Maliki acquired direct control of the army by establishing a 
central office which he used to appoint one general for every province, who had command and 
control of all armed forces in that province.229 By dismissing competent Sunni officers and 
replacing them with less competent Shia commanders who were loyal to him, Maliki established 
Shia dominance over Sunni communities, weakened the army and further angered the Sunni 
community.230 Furthermore, Maliki was frequently accused of turning the national army and the 
security services into Shia-led militias.231 A wide range of government officials, from members of 
parliament to ministers or local councilors, enjoyed the protection of vast amounts of security 
forces.232 Maliki himself enjoyed the protection of a battalion of eight hundred men, as did several 
vice presidents, and the President’s personal protection consisted of six thousand Kurdish 
fighters.233 The military's corruption also alienated the local population: local citizens were 
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frequently detained without sufficient reason, and could often only be released through paying 
bribes.234  
 Both the great sense of Sunni alienation and anger, as well as Maliki's deliberate weakening 
of the Iraqi state and military, have contributed to the emergence of Daesh on multiple levels. By 
putting the army under his personal rule and appointing incompetent officers, Maliki has therefore 
also undermined the first condition for state survival: the state's ability to control coercion across 
its territory and maintain a monopoly on the use of force. This becomes especially apparent when 
taking a closer look at the fall of Mosul in 2014.  
 
4.3 – Case study: The fall of Mosul 
On 10 June 2014, Daesh took control of Mosul, Iraq's second largest city. Approximately 
30,000 Iraqi forces were unable to defeat some 1500 Daesh fighters.235 Daesh’s ability to defeat 
the Iraqi army highlights both the weakness of the Iraqi army and the strength of Daesh, which can 
be largely ascribed to the aforementioned former Ba’athists who influenced Daesh’s organizational 
and military capacity. Moreover, as the then governor of the Nineveh province Atheel al-Nujaif 
explained, it is especially telling that this happened in Mosul rather than elsewhere in Iraq: the 
atmosphere in Mosul at the time was particularly beneficial for a group like Daesh. “People were 
under the heavy pressure of the army and the regime. They didn’t like the army and needed 
someone to protect them from the army. Also, the police and the army resorted to sectarian 
attitudes when doing their duties.”236 As such, this confirms what the previous sections have 
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established, namely that this environment has been created by policies that came forth from de-
Ba’athification. "In some areas (…) it took extended guerrilla operations and urban warfare to 
keep out government forces, but in Mosul, Tikrit and other recent ISIL offensives, retreat was 
voluntary and disorganized rather than forced by heavy fighting."237 The Iraqi army experienced a 
total and sudden collapse in Mosul: most soldiers retreated retreated in disarray, with many 
reporting that their positions had collapsed without shots having been fired.238 Bearing in mind 
how Maliki weakened and divided the Iraqi army, the collapse of the Iraqi army in Mosul and the 
rapid emergence of Daesh afterwards seems a logical consequence of Maliki’s actions. Years of 
corruption and improper leadership had resulted in an army that was undermanned, under-
equipped, and undertrained.239 Military personnel were often ill-prepared for battle: some had 
never even been to a firing range.240 Furthermore, soldiers were treated very poorly, which helps 
further explain why Daesh experienced little resistance when seizing control of Mosul.241 For 
example, high-ranking officers in Mosul were tasked with budgeting food purchases for their 
soldiers, but most officers instead kept this money to themselves, and soldiers had to buy and 
prepare their own food from civilian markets.242 Such practices reduced Iraqi soldiers' willingness 
to fight, as one Iraqi officer explained: "Corruption takes more than soldiers' food rations. It takes 
their dignity and self-respect as well."243 Moreover, the problem of ‘ghost’ soldiers also 
contributed to a low morale among Iraqi soldiers, for it made them aware that desertion will not 
necessarily take away their income. Due to this lack of motivation, soldiers were often unwilling 
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to fight and had little faith in the military's ability to protect them and their families from possible 
sectarian retaliation.244  
However, aside from the poor training and equipment and general lack of morale among 
soldiers, another prevalent consequence of de-Ba’athification can be seen in Mosul: the 
sectarianism in the security forces. Widespread acts of brutality, killings, and torture were reported 
by citizens with regards to the the operational commander of the Nineveh province245, Lt. Gen. 
Mahdi Gharawi.246 Gharawi’s troops had been accused of carrying out arbitrary arrests, the killing 
and torture of prisoners, and the use of excessive force.247 Moreover, Gharawi had reportedly sold 
Sunni prisoners to Shia militias, and had been accused by the U.S. of using his police brigades as 
a front for a Shia militia that was responsible for the murder of hundreds of Sunnis.248 Maliki, a 
close ally of Gharawi, resisted U.S. attempts to have Gharawi arrested or removed from his 
position.249 This serves as another example of the damage that Maliki has done by using the 
military for his personal and political gain, and the far-reaching consequences of the increased 
sectarianism as a result of the muhasasa system. All of the above mentioned factors combined 
allowed Mosul to become a Daesh stronghold and have highlighted the weakness and division 
within the Iraqi army, and the alienation of local populations by the increased sectarianism in the 
armed forces. 
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Conclusion 
 This chapter has demonstrated how de-Ba’athification on the military level has contributed 
to the emergence of Daesh on several different levels. It has first established a direct connection 
between de-Ba’athification and the emergence of Daesh by demonstrating how former Ba’athists 
make up the vast majority of current Daesh leadership and how they utilized their organizational 
and military skills to make Daesh a strong, well-functioning organization capable of controlling 
large parts of Iraqi territory. The disbanding of the Iraqi military encouraged former Ba’athists to 
join the insurgency not only because it facilitated state collapse and left them unemployed, but 
also because Maliki’s subsequent sectarian influence on the military fueled Sunni alienation and 
resistance to his government. This chapter has also demonstrated that former Ba’athists joined 
Daesh for practical and strategic reasons rather than ideological ones, further reinforcing the 
argument that de-Ba’athification has created the insurgents of Daesh. The fact that Daesh 
encountered little resistance when seizing control of Mosul then highlights both the weakness of 
the Iraqi army and the strength of Daesh. All three subchapters stress how de-Ba’athification took 
on many different forms and how intertwined these different forms are: how the strength of Daesh 
came forth from de-Ba’athification and how the Iraqi military’s weakness is a result of military 
de-Ba’athification as well. The fall of Mosul demonstrated how the Iraqi military not only lacked 
proper organizational capacity, but also suffered from a low morale among its soldiers because of 
widespread corruption and poor treatment and training of military personnel. Both the weakness 
of the Iraqi army and the fall of Mosul are indirect consequences of the de-Ba’athification of Iraq 
because the haste with which the military was rebuilt resulted in its inherent weakness, and the 
complete disbanding of the army post-invasion allowed groups like AQI and Daesh to flourish. 
This can also be related back to the political consequences of de-Ba’athification as discussed in 
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Chapter 3 because the muhasasa system introduced sectarianism into every aspect of Iraqi politics, 
allowing Maliki to divide the Iraqi army along sectarian lines as well.  
As such, it can be concluded that the CPA’s rigorous disbanding of the Iraqi army and 
refusal to include former Ba’athists or former soldiers250 has created the insurgents of Daesh, by 
rendering them unemployed and seeking revenge, and simultaneously made it harder for the U.S. 
army to combat the insurgency. By indirectly encouraging former Ba’athists to join the insurgency, 
CPA Order 2 has allowed Daesh to develop into a well-organized non-state actor, exemplified by 
its takeover of Mosul. The haste with which the CPA has rebuilt the Iraqi army has made it 
inherently weak, and has allowed Maliki to turn it into a corrupt, sectarian army used for personal 
political gain, thereby further weakening it and allowing Daesh to become a powerful actor in the 
Iraqi state.  
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Conclusion  
The connection between de-Ba’athification and Daesh is not as simple as the title of this 
thesis may have it seem. As I have sought to demonstrate throughout this thesis, there are many 
steps that need to be taken in between that connect de-Ba’athification to Daesh. Both direct and 
indirect factors contributing to the emergence of Daesh have consistently emerged and reinforced 
each other over longer periods of time and on multiple different levels.   
This thesis has established the main driving forces behind Daesh and demonstrated how 
they relate to de-Ba’athification. State collapse and a lack of state security, corruption, mass 
dismissal of Ba’athists, increased sectarianism as a result of the muhasasa system and a lack of the 
state’s institutional capacity, sectarianism in the security forces: all of these factors are a result of 
de-Ba’athification and can be directly or indirectly linked to the emergence of Daesh. While the 
insurgency originally began as a result of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, this thesis has sought to 
emphasize the crucial role de-Ba’athification has played both in fueling and supporting the 
intensity and duration of the insurgency.  
Every chapter of this thesis has made a valuable contribution to answering the research 
question: How did the de-Ba’athification policy as implemented by the United States after the 
overthrow of Saddam Hussein lead to the emergence of Daesh in early 2014? By assessing the 
dominance of the Ba’ath party over most aspects of Iraqi society and its crucial role in providing 
citizens with basic everyday necessities, Chapter 1 provided a framework from which to further 
analyze the consequences of the de-Ba’athification policy, which destroyed the state’s 
infrastructural capacity. Moreover, this chapter has helped in explaining the significance of 
secondary identity traits that Daesh acted upon. Chapter 2 provided necessary and detailed 
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information about the CPA orders that are known as de-Ba’athification. By highlighting how much 
knowledge and expertise was left out of the decision-making process, it has contributed to creating 
a better understanding of the disastrous outcomes of the de-Ba’athification policy. Despite the 
many warnings against the execution of these orders, they were implemented nonetheless.  
After providing the context necessary to frame the main argument of this thesis, Chapter 3 
focused on how de-Ba’athification contributed to the creation of an environment from which 
Daesh could emerge. By providing a theoretical framework for state survival and state collapse, 
this chapter has shown how de-Ba’athification removed all elements necessary for state survival. 
Moreover, Maliki’s corruption and sectarianism, largely a result of the muhasasa system which 
was implemented by the U.S. after de-Ba’athification, alienated the Sunni community and resulted 
in a government unable to provide its citizens with basic goods and services, forcing them to turn 
elsewhere for support. The insurgency that began as a result of the U.S. invasion combined with 
the collapse of the Iraqi state has intensified notions of secondary identity traits. All of these factors 
combined created an environment in which Daesh could flourish.  
The Future of Iraq Project, a gathering of over 200 Iraqi and U.S. officials providing 
recommendations on the future of Iraq after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, warned against “a 
total de-Ba’athification that does not allow for the reintegration of Ba’athists into society.”251 
Chapter 4 shows the consequences of the CPA’s decision to ignore this advice: the majority of 
Daesh leadership now consists of former Ba’athists who joined the insurgency after their 
institutions were disbanded. Analyzing their involvement in Daesh demonstrated not only how 
they played a crucial role in turning Daesh into a powerful non-state actor, but also that their most 
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likely motivations to join Daesh were strategic and practical rather than ideological: there were 
many alternatives to Daesh for those seeking to join the insurgency out of ideological reasons. 
Moreover, these Ba’athists motivations were also most likely the result of de-Ba’athification. Not 
only did CPA Order 1 and 2 leave former Ba’athists unemployed, their involvement in Daesh also 
has its roots in the collapse of the Iraqi state as was discussed in Chapter 3. As such, military de-
Ba’athification both directly and indirectly facilitated the emergence of Daesh. It contributed to 
the weakness of the Iraqi army, by disbanding it before it could be re-established, excluding former 
soldiers and allowing sectarianism to infiltrate the military, and to the strength of Daesh, by 
creating insurgents and leaving Daesh leadership with professional military and organizational 
skills.   
Throughout this thesis I have stressed how these different factors work together: they each 
have their separate effect on contributing to the emergence of Daesh, but also work together and 
frequently reinforce each other. Factors discussed in every chapter can therefore be connected to 
previous chapters. The strength and dominance of the Ba’ath party as discussed in Chapter 1 is 
connected to the execution of the de-Ba’athification orders in Chapter 2, because it has 
demonstrated how crucial the Ba’ath party was for stability in Iraq. The weakness of the Iraqi army 
as discussed in Chapter 4 relates back to political de-Ba’athification as discussed in Chapter 3 
which made Iraqi politics increasingly sectarian. Moreover, by disbanding the entire Iraqi 
government structure, de-Ba’athification allowed for Maliki to exert personal influence over the 
military, making it increasingly sectarian and creating deep alienation between the state and its 
citizens. The state collapse caused by de-Ba’athification not only resulted in the state’s failure to 
provide its citizens with basic goods and services, but also further fueled sectarianism. The case 
study of the fall of Mosul was a case in point where many of these different factors played out 
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simultaneously. Altogether, Chapters 3 and 4 demonstrate most clearly how de-Ba’athification 
created Daesh: it has contributed to both creating the environment from which Daesh could 
emerge, and has directly contributed to creating the insurgents. 
 It is likely that Daesh can be explained in other ways rather than through de-Ba’athification 
alone. This is one of the limitations of this thesis: I have focused solely on explaining Daesh 
through de-Ba’athification not only because it has allowed me to make a valuable contribution to 
the existing gap in the academic literature, but also because I consider the consequences of de-
Ba’athification crucial in understanding the current state of affairs in Iraq. I have specifically 
sought to highlight the complexity of the many different factors that have contributed to the 
emergence of Daesh. The “State of the field” section in the Introduction showed that one of the 
most prevalent explanations for Daesh relates to religion. With this thesis I hope to have shown 
that for Daesh, religion is merely a means to an end, rather than the primary cause of its existence.  
 At the time of writing, mid-July 2017, the territory of Daesh’s self-proclaimed state in Iraq 
is rapidly declining. Six days ago, Iraqi prime minister Haider al-Abadi arrived in Mosul to declare 
its liberation and congratulate Iraq’s armed forces on their victory over Daesh.252 “Their fictitious 
state has fallen”, declared an Iraqi army commander on state television.253 Over the past year and 
a half, Daesh has been driven from Fallujah, Ramadi and Mosul, their three most strategically 
significant strongholds in Iraq. Nevertheless, while Daesh in Iraq may be declining, the 
circumstances that allowed them to emerge have not changed. This thesis has shown that Daesh is 
the result of a multitude of different factors that have played out on different levels over longer 
																																																													
252 Tim Arango and Michael R. Gordon, “Iraqi Prime Minister Arrives in Mosul to Declare Victory over ISIS”, The 
New York Times, 9 July 2017. 
253 Josie Ensor, “’Their fictitious state has fallen’: Iraqi army victorious after retaking mosque where ISIL leader 
Baghdadi declared caliphate”, The Telegraph, 29 June 2017.  
74 
	
periods of time. It would therefore be too simplistic to assume that Iraq’s problems are solved by 
merely weakening and eliminating Daesh. The legacy of de-Ba’athification, fourteen years after 
its implementation, still lives on. If the Iraqi government continues to fail to address the social, 
political, and economic circumstances that allowed Daesh to establish its caliphate in the first 
place, history will undoubtedly repeat itself in Iraq. 
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